Abstract. Successful solution to any environmental problem implies working with Knightian uncertainty that explicitly deals with decision making under conditions of unstructured randomness. A 'wild' type of randomness that we will never discern due to its unstable properties makes the assignment of corresponding probabilities impossible. For that reason, the consideration of general economical factors within cost/benefit analysis must fail. So, instead of governmental intervention and a cup and trade scheme, we propose a direct financial market of certificates on environmental improvements. The approach is based on the Principal-Agent method. In this study we analyze the problem of one agent only, and take as example deforestation issues.
1. Introduction. The Kyoto Protocol, the most popular agenda for reducing pollution by trading carbon quotas, has been raising doubts whether it in fact cleans the environment or just shifts polluting gasses around. It seems that the permits-to-pollute approach takes the worst of the poles: strong governmental intervention (with all the bureaucracy behind), and wild free market. History and the recent financial crisis prove that each one fails over the long term, and the mixture of both cannot lead to positive results. In his tions of emissions). Our models are just examples of how certificates can be handled and not to take them as a rule for modeling.
2. The models. To explain how relevant optimization problems for good environmental certificates could be handled, we will introduce two models (diffusions). In the first model we are able to solve the problem completely in the case of linear certificates. In the second model, using dual technique, we represent the optimal agent's action (under additional assumption and in the case of logarithmic award) in terms of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier.
To find it, one has to solve the equation involving the expectation of complicated but in a sense elementary functionals of Brownian Motion, at the moment we offer a semi-closed solution.
We provide "soft" theoretical justification of both. Further analysis of their real applicability and calibration depends on experience. In our setting, to start the project, we do not need precise models! 2 . "Good" certificates would contribute positively to the environment in any circumstances! 3. General problem. Consider a static local goal with the horizon T . The general problem is the following: given fund S, emit (Principal) certificate F that after the optimal agent's action u(F ), generates
represents the number of trees at time s in a given area. More formally: Let u be the agent's action adapted to the Brownian filtration that modifies the dynamic of the corresponding process X u s , by adding u = u(F, s), where F (X u s , s ≤ T ) is the agent's award at time T . Here 0 ≤ F ≤ S, and S is the corresponding fund. Let
The problem consists in the maximization of two functionals stemming from:
J 1 becomes the agent's net monetary award. 2 Principal's optimization problem that emits certificates F ,
In our first model we will consider f (s) ≡ 1 only. Decreasing f would, however, be more suitable.
The Principal representing the Nature is here the financial institution in charge of the management of the fund. The Principal issues certificates to agents.
We assume that X(s) can be monitored with desirable reliability. Awards are limited by funds. There are two general possibilities to work with bounded awards:
1. Set bounds on unbounded models. 2. Consider bounded models.
It seems that the second choice is easier to analyze. In the first choice it is unclear how models should be handled after hitting the corresponding barrier and, moreover, after the optimal agents's action the hitting time usually doesn't have explicit probability law. Moreover in several specific applications like reforestation issues, models are bounded by respective capacities. Therefore bounded models are more appropriate. In biological systems the Pearl-Verhulst model defined by
represents the growth with saturation. However we need models with absolute saturation (bounded). Our examples meet these requirements.
We shall assume here agent's linear utility and thus without losing the general approach one certificate sold. For practical applications certificates should be traded producing possibly the concentration of capital in the hands of powerful individuals able to stop environmental degradation.
As an advance of more general analysis we will study two models with some restrictions on awards and optimal agent's actions. In both models we shall work with more continuous time models as an approximation of "discrete time reality." 4. Model 1. The number of trees in a given area is represented by the diffusion process X(t) defined by:
with W (t) Brownian Motion, X(0) = x, 0 < x < k, k is the capacity, and f is any function ensuring existence and uniqueness of the solution, cf. Revuz, Yor (1999); and
We will impose conditions such that the optimal agent action u * (t) ≥ β and it will be deterministic, therefore our comment about the existence and uniqueness holds. In this case 0 ≤ X(t) ≤ k. We will see that solutions of corresponding optimization problems will be f free.
To simplify the notation we shall set k = 1. We use this parametrization factorizing u(s) and β, to ensure the absolute saturation. There is some intuitive motivation of this model. Large X means no big environmental problems and consequently, lower deforestation rate, while interpreting u(s) as an effort, this produces smaller changes in the drift. Another pattern will be considered in model 2. Here we will consider linear awards only.
It is convenient to write the award as
where A, γ, S ≥ 0, and the agent's cost is δ T 0 u 2 (s)(1 − X(s))ds. This cost can be seen as a compromise between both: quadratic (of effort) and linear (of actual state). The cost is smaller for larger X (reforestation is cheaper). For simplicity sake we set δ = 1. We have to choose optimal A and γ such that after the optimal agent's action E(
Theorem 4.1. For linear certificates and under the condition that optimal agent's effort u is bounded for any T > 0, the optimal linear certificate is: take A as large as possible with the following restrictions:
Proof. The Bellman approach leads to the following equation for the value function:
We will find the solution of the form F (x, t) = h(t)(1 − x) and so it will be f free. We get the following equation for h(t):
Setting h(t) = 4H(t) − 2β we obtain the trivial Riccati equation
In our setting it is desirable to ensure the existence of bounded agent's optimal action (independently of T ). This fact translates easily into β 2 ≥ A. So we have to solve the problem with the following constraints:
The second and third conditions result from the fact that the total award in any case must be positive and, respectively, to ensure that u * (t) ≥ β for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Writing 
After some elementary work we obtain that the solution is: Set A as large as possible.
Model 2.
The second model is defined by dX(t) = X(t)(k − X(t))dW (t) + (δu(t) − β)X(t)(k − X(t))dt
As before we set k = 1, δ = 1, and for example β = . We are able to obtain the semi-closed solution of agent's optimization problem in the case of an award F (X(T )) with special choice of F , and special form of agent's action.
In this model the deforestation and effort effect produce larger changes of drift for middle sizes of X(t).
Assume that the agent cost is
The motivation is similar to given in the previous model. Our solution will be based on heavy use of Girsanov's theorem that will change the law of corresponding process to the one of the auxiliary model:
. By Itô's Lemma:
is clearly a martingale, M (0) = x = 1 2 . Therefore ∀z, E(−zM (T ) + zx) = 0. Assume that the agent acts in locally optimal way. It means that at time s chooses the adopted action u(s) that maximizes instantaneous drift minus cost if written as H(u(s), W (s)) · F (X(s)); taking X(s) as a constant.
The set of strategies that depend actually on W (s) only, we shall call U. Because X(s) depends on u(s), there is no reason that this procedure will produce globally optimal strategy.
Using standard dual method, our goal is to maximize with respect to u(s) ∈ U
To make calculations more explicit we choose:
F (x) = ln(x + B), B > 1.
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Theorem 5.1. The optimal agent's locally optimal effort u(t) =žZ(t) and optimal
z is the Lagrange multiplier and can be calculated from equation (1) that involves expectation (2) of functionals of Brownian motion given by (3) and (4).
Proof. Standard approach gives formulas for u(t) and X(T ). The Lagrange multiplierž is such that
The only problem to calculatež is to calculate
where under the "∼" law
Firstly we take away the termže
) using Girsanov's theorem:
We use the standard notation: for given martingale M , E(M ) T means e
This change of measure needs justification. We leave it to the appendix. Under P * law
which is much closer to our auxiliary process. Secondly and lastly we use once again Girsanov's theorem to express the expectation (2) as 
This formula jointly with (1) represents what we called previously semi-closed solution.
Conclusions.
1. This study extends our previous ones (2003), (2004) . See also D'Amato and Franckx (2003) . In their study the authors considered the case when "The private agent can allocate its effort to environmental protection or to its core task". In this case the role of proper choice of parameters, unlike in our case, can not be avoided. 2. The course of actions we propose is a trade-off between environmental concern and economic benefits for those involved; rewarding positive environmental actions like and planting trees (reforestation) or polluting less and, more importantly, by stimulating transfer of new technologies. 3. Certificates that embrace larger regions could automatically generate these necessary transfers. 4. Different optimization problems could be formulated and solved for certificates of the form S − t 0 F (X(s) + Y (S))ds for some convex function F . Here X(s) and Y (s) represent pollution level in two regions. Allowing agent 1 living in region 1 to make improvements in region 2 can be called fusion and lead directly to transfer of technologies beyond well studied collusive or Nash equilibrium. This approach is now in development in our studies with promising results. 5. We hardly know the social cost of pollution or deforestation. In first applications one can use any good environmental certificates and do not worry about their optimalities in specific models behind.
7. Appendix. Without loss of generality we may assumež = 1. To justify the second change of measure we need to prove that and satisfies dV (t) = V (t)(1 − V (t)dt + V (t)dW (t).
The law of this process we will call P . The best way to prove that H(t) is true martingale is through some equivalences of laws of processes on F V T , ∀T . Note that V (t) is the Pearl-Verhulst model. Let under the law Q, dV (t) = V (t)dt + V (t)dW (t). The law Q is equivalent to the law Q 1 . Under Q 1 , V (t) = e W (t)− Z T is clearly true martingale and by Girsanov's theorem changes the law Q 1 intoQ such that underQ, dV (t) = −V 2 (t)dt + V (t)dW (t).
MoreoverZ T > 0, underQ measure. Therefore Q ∼ Q 1 ∼Q ∼ P on F T , and we have proved that Z T is a P martingale. The last equivalence is obvious.
